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Jekyll and Hyde1: 
Men's Constructions of Feminism and Feminists2 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Research and commentary on men's responses to feminism has demonstrated 
the range of ways in which men have mobilised both against and for feminist 
principles. This paper argues that further analyses of men's responses require 
a sophisticated theory of discourse acknowledging the fragmented and 
contradictory nature of representation. A corpus of men's talk on feminism 
and feminists was studied to identify the pervasive patterns in men's 
accounting and regularities in rhetorical organisation. Material from two 
samples of men was included: a sample of white middle-class 17-18 year old 
school students and a sample of 60 interviews with a more diverse sample of 
older men aged 20 to 64. Two interpretative repertoires of feminism and 
feminists were identified. These set up a 'Jekyll and Hyde' binary and 
positioned feminism along with feminists very differently as reasonable 
versus extreme and monstrous. Both repertoires tended to be deployed 
together and the paper explores the ideological and interactional 
consequences of typical deployments along with the identity work 
accomplished by the men as they positioned themselves in relation to these. 
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Whilst feminism is first and foremost a social movement for women, it has 
obvious implications for the lives of men.  A central tenet of feminism holds 
that gender relations are power relations, which implies that any 
improvement in the position of women must, in a sense, be 'off-set' by a 
reduction of the power and influence wielded by men (Segal, 1990).  Heath 
(1987) has argued that feminism "makes things unsafe for men, unsettles 
assumed positions [and] undoes given identities" (pg. 6 - see also Hearn, 
1999).  It is little wonder, therefore, that many men have felt it necessary to 
engage with feminism and feminist arguments especially when feminism has 
unsettled what is taken for granted as 'normal practice' in the kitchen and the 
bedroom.  It is not something that can be ignored. 
 
One of the main ways in which men have responded in the public arena is by 
launching a counter-offensive (Faludi, 1992; Ford, 1985).  Evidence for this 
kind of anti-feminist backlash can be found in the writings of academics 
such as Warren Farrell (1994) and Neil Lyndon (1992) who have both 
attempted to argue that patriarchy is nothing but a feminist myth.  Farrell 
claims that it is men who are the real victims in society and that it is their 
position, rather than that of women, that is in most need of state protection.  
Baker (1994) has suggested that similar kinds of sentiments are to be found 
in wider society too.  For instance, she notes that on both sides of the 
Atlantic there are many who feel that feminism has undermined the rights of 
fathers and destabilised the institution of the family.  This has resulted in the 
formation of a number of different pressure groups determined to contest 
things like the current legislation on divorce and child custody, as well as the 
criminalisation of rape within marriage.  It is also claimed that a further way 
that men have fought back is through the production of a heavily negative 
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stereotype of feminists themselves.  Percy and Kremer (1995), for example, 
have noted how media representations of feminists portray them as both 
militant and physically unattractive.  One of the main consequences of this, 
they argue, is that many women are put off from identifying as feminist (see 
also Griffin, 1989 and Renzetti, 1987). 
 
There have been other commentators, however, who have painted a more 
positive picture of the ways in which men have responded to feminism.  
Dominelli (1999), for example, argues that whilst some men have resisted 
feminist arguments point-blank, others have attempted to embrace them.  
Once again evidence of this can be found within the academy which, in 
recent years, has seen a number of publications which are both written by 
and critical of men (egs. Brod, 1987; Brittan, 1989; Connell, 1995; Coyle 
and Morgan-Sykes, 1998; Hearn and Morgan, 1990; Kaufmann, 1987; 
Kimmel, 1989; Seidler, 1994; Wild, 1999).  There have also been promising 
reports of attitude change outside of the academic domain.  In Thomas' 
(1990) research, for example, she claims that feminist arguments can be seen 
to have had a positive impact upon (at least some) men's thinking about 
themselves and the world they inhabit. In general men's responses to 
feminism, the subject positions they take up and the social consequences of 
their discursive and ideological manoeuvres will be inflected by their other 
social identities such as class and race. The 'new man', for instance, 
emerging in the 1980s represented a particular racialised, middle-class 
construction of masculinity. 
 
While welcoming this attention on men's mobilisations in response to 
feminism, we want to argue that such research requires a more sophisticated 
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analysis of discourse and the ways in which collectively shared discursive 
resources operate. There needs to be more attention paid to the nature of 
these discursive resources and the ways in which they produce subject 
positions and identities and work ideologically to maintain power relations. 
One feature of existing research, for example, is the tendency to imply that 
men, both inside and outside of academia, can be neatly divided into 
different categories or camps: radicals and reactionaries, New Men and 
traditional men, pro and anti-feminists (see also Connell, 1995).  Indeed, this 
is done most explicitly in Thomas' (1990) research in which she uses factor 
analysis (Q-Sort) to generate a schema of eleven different masculine 
identities including 'liberal pro-feminist', old-fashioned masculinity' and 
'self-consciously macho'. In line with previous work in discursive 
psychology on global forms of sense-making (Billig, 1991; Billig et al., 
1989; Wetherell and Potter, 1992), we anticipate that men's discourse on 
feminism will be more varied, fragmented and heterogeneous and, indeed, 
that the ideological thrust of discourse (in maintaining oppressive power 
relations) depends precisely on contradiction, dilemma and the complex 
multi-faceted positionings of self and other which can be mobilised in 
multiple rhetorical directions with varying consequences for social relations. 
 
In this paper we report on some of the main patterns in a large corpus of 
men's discourse around feminism and feminists. The analysis of this material 
is conducted according to the theory and method of discursive psychology 
(Edwards and Potter, 1992; Harre and Gillett, 1994; Potter and Wetherell, 
1987) in particular the more synthetic and global form of analysis 
characteristic of more critical discursive psychology (Wetherell, 1998).  In 
keeping with our previous work in this area (Edley and Wetherell, 1996; 
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1997; 1999; Wetherell and Edley, 1998; 1999), we combine a focus on the 
local organisation of talk with an interest in the organisation of the broad, 
social and culturally resonant interpretative resources participants draw 
upon.  Thus, on the one hand, we try and study how talk is organised as 
social action in its immediate context, the subject positions in play and the 
rhetorical and interactional consequences of this organisation, focusing on 
participants' orientations to clarify and identify these elements. On the other 
hand, we assume that talk (particularly about a 'social issue' such as 
feminism) assumes regular patterns that reveal the shared sense-making 
resources of a sample or which may be specific to a site, institution or 
characteristic of a broader social context and historical period. These 
resources are always, of course, customised for the particular discursive 
context but are revealing about the taken for granted and indicate the marks 
of power relations. Inevitably, depending on the size of the discourse corpus 
being investigated and the particular research questions, analysis will 
emphasise one of these focal points more strongly than the other. In this 
study, we are dealing with a large corpus and our research aim is similarly 
broad. Our aim is to summarise and identify the regular and most pervasive 
patterns in our samples' ways of talking about feminism and feminists and to 
discuss the implications of these. Analysis, therefore, will be relatively 
global in nature.  (For a detailed discussion of the epistemological and 
methodological difficulties in combining more fine-grain conversation 
analytic and ethnomethodological approaches with Foucauldian and post-
structuralist theories of discourse and a justification for this combined 
approach see Wetherell, 1998).    
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Materials and Procedure 
 
The corpus of discourse used for this study comes from a relatively large-
scale project on the construction of masculine identities (Edley and 
Wetherell, 1995; 1996; 1997; Wetherell and Edley, 1998). Part of this 
project involved a period of fieldwork conducted in and around the sixth 
form common room of a UK-based independent boys' school which included 
tape-recorded and transcribed interviews with small groups of 17-18 year 
old male students. Each group of three young men was interviewed (by 
Nigel Edley) around eight times in school time over a period of 
approximately three months. The participants in this study were ethnically 
homogeneous and all came from white English backgrounds.  A second 
source of data comes from a set of 'one off' small group discussions with 
over 60 men, aged between 20 and 64 years. This sample was more 
ethnically diverse but predominantly white and came from a wide range of 
occupations and social class backgrounds.  All these participants were at the 
time doing foundation courses on various Open University degree 
programmes and were mature distance learning students.  The participants 
were volunteers, whose anonymity is guaranteed through the use of 
pseudonyms.  In the extracts that follow, each comes with a "post-script" 
identifying the interview from which the material is taken.  Codes "A2" and 
"B5", for example, represent extracts taken from the second meeting of 
Group A and the fifth meeting of Group B of the sixth form study. Whilst 
"OU1" and "OU 7" represent data from the first and seventh Open 
University interviews respectively. In this paper, the data from both studies 
are combined as the main discursive patterns we wish to discuss were found 
strongly across both samples. 
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The interviews were designed to explore a range of different issues central to 
men's lives, including work, relationships, images of men in popular culture 
and feminism and social change (see Wetherell, 1994 for full details).  The 
topics of feminism and social change were introduced in the interviews 
using variants of three standard questions: (i) What is a feminist (or 
feminism)?  (ii) What do you think of feminism?  (iii) What do feminists 
want? These questions and their variants set the discursive environment and 
the discursive tasks for the participants. They were designed to explore the 
interpretative resources men might have available for making sense of 
feminism. We wanted the men to engage in both descriptive and evaluative 
work and we were interested in the 'theatre of characters' men might 
construct in relation to feminism. These aims are reflected in the particular 
formulations used and the focus in the questions on feminists as actors. 
 
We assume that men's responses to these questions would be both 
occasioned (produced for the particular context of the interview) and yet also 
revealing of the collectively shared discursive constructions of feminism 
which make up the social contexts in which feminism is negotiated in private 
and public arenas. The interviewer (NE) did not elaborate his own views on 
feminism to the participants but we note that the general discursive context 
in which the responses were produced includes participants' readings of what 
might be appropriate for an interview conducted as part of a gender studies 
research project. 
 
Analysis proceeded by first building up a data file of all the discourse related 
to feminism and feminists mostly generated in response to the three 
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questions listed above but including any extended discussion of feminism in 
the interviews. In this discourse analysis, as noted, we will be particularly 
concerned with global patterns across the corpus, presenting data extracts to 
illustrate pervasive patterns. In line with our aim to clarify men's shared 
broad interpretative resources and with our chosen mode of analysis we will 
not be so concerned to explicate the occasioned deployment of these 
resources except where this is relevant to revealing the general organisation 
of the men's sense-making in this area. 
 
 
Analysis and Discussion 
Jekyll and Hyde: Constructing the Janus Faces3 of Feminism 
 
One of the most pervasive patterns in our corpus was the presence of two 
competing interpretative repertoires or accounts of feminists and feminism. 
An interpretative repertoire (Potter and Wetherell, 1987) is a recognisable 
routine of arguments, descriptions and evaluations distinguished by familiar 
cliches, common places, tropes and characterisations of actors and situations. 
Such repertoires become evident through repetition across a corpus. The 
collectively shared social consensus behind an interpretative repertoire is 
often so established and so familiar that only a fragment of the 
argumentative chain needs to be formulated in talk to count as an adequate 
reference and for the participants to jointly recognise the routine that is 
developing. 
 
One of the two contrasting interpretative repertoires evident in this corpus 
can be seen in Extracts One and Two.   
 
Pr
e-P
rin
t
1. NIGEL: What are feminists (.) what are they after? 
HARRY: Women?  What do women want? 
NIGEL: What do feminists want (.) yeah 
HARRY: Equality 
NIGEL: Right (.) just that? 
HARRY: Just that (.) equality (.) they er (.) that's all they need 
(OU18: 21) 
 
2. NIGEL: Okay, so what (...) do you think feminists are after? 
JASON: The way I see it is equality 
GREG: I was gonna say in one word equality of opportunities put 
[inaudible] opportunities yes but equal rights in (.) in everything 
(OU 12: 37) 
 
This liberal feminist repertoire of feminism was frequently presented in this 
very straight-forward, even minimal, way which portrayed feminists as 
simply wanting equality. The obviousness of the argument is such that 'one 
word' is sufficient. 
 
The second very pervasive interpretative repertoire evident in the corpus 
differed in a number of important respects.  First, it tended to be a much 
more complex or elaborate construction, composed from a larger array of 
recurrent themes. Second, it tended to be an embodied account personifying 
feminism (picking up on the possibility for this in the formulation of the 
interviewer's question). Here a highly theatrical character was routinely 
constructed for the feminist. Most commonly, answers included details about 
the supposed physical appearance of the feminist, her sexual orientation and 
her general attitude towards men. This repertoire worked principally through 
the overt subject position constructed for the feminist (see Davies and Harré, 
1990).   
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3. NIGEL: Give me an imaginary picture of a feminist. 
ADRIAN: I seem to think of a feminist woman as like ugly women (.) 
with like shaved hair (.) stuff like that you know (.) who can't get a chap 
and so they think "I'll become a feminist" 
NIGEL: Right 
ADRIAN: Lesbians (.) that sort of thing (.) I don't know (A1: 8) 
 
4. NIGEL: What do you think feminists want of men? [laughter] 
SIMON: Well, I think they want us all to jump in the river don't they 
really?  Kill ourselves?  I dunno (.) slaves? (...) I think at times they seem to 
have us under siege and always blaming us for some of the most 
ridiculous things and I think to myself "What the hell do these people 
want? Do they want us dead or what?" I mean they don't want to find any 
common ground (.) they just hate men (.) regardless (.) all men  (OU2: 45) 
 
As is clear from Extracts Three and Four, the third major point of difference 
between the two repertoires concerned their evaluative status. Indeed, the 
two repertoires worked in a 'Jekyll and Hyde' or 'good cop/bad cop' fashion.  
Like Jekyll, feminism and feminists in the first interpretative repertoire have 
a benign, sane and rational, positive or neutral character.  Feminist desires 
for gender equality were usually reported as simple, ordinary and quite 
reasonable matters of fact.  Yet, when feminism and feminists turn into 
Hyde, they become highly coloured. In line with the fictional reference, the 
feminist was now portrayed as something of a monstrous ogre or fiend. 
 
So far, we have presented these two repertoires separately with the 
implication that men could perhaps now be categorised into two types 
according to which repertoire represented their basic attitudes to feminism. 
In practice, men's accounts of feminism moved backwards and forwards 
across the discursive field established by these two interpretative repertoires, 
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often through the process of arguing and puzzling described by Billig 
(1987). 
 
There were a number of instances within our interviews where the two 
repertoires formed the basis of arguments between participants about the 
true nature of feminists.  A few turns after the end of Extract 3, for example, 
saw another member of Group A challenging Adrian's portrait, claiming 
instead that they were "just people who feel strongly about being put down".  
Similarly, within another part of the sixth form study, one of the participants 
told of his English teacher's pronouncements on feminism where, once 
again, the same two representations are set up as competing truth-claims.  
 
5. NATHAN: He's (.) well seeing as we're (.) we're in my group doing a 
feminist novel in the French Lieutenant's Woman and he's giving us his 
opinions on feminism (.) how feminists (.) they don't want equality with 
men they want to be better than men and they want to destroy all 
tradition without having anything to put in it's place (.) and there's a kind 
of anarchy sort of thing but I don't know (.) personally I could take some 
of his arguments but I think it's more trying to be equal 
(B3: 31-2)  
 
In the remainder of this analysis, we want to examine the ideological and 
interactional consequences of the Jekyll and Hyde style 'binarisation' of 
discourse around feminism and feminists. We will argue that much of the 
ideological thrust of men's discourse on feminism is carried by the ways in 
which the two sides of this polarised, and often embodied and personified, 
Jekyll and Hyde type binary are worked together and the rhetorical relations 
this allows. We will examine the regular and routine ways in which these 
two repertoires are deployed together and the typical rhetorical 
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consequences of that deployment.  In this discussion we will pay attention 
also to the 'identity work' being accomplished and the consequences for 
men's own positioning. For example, if we look again at Extract 5, Nathan 
seems to be doing far more than simply advancing the truth-status of a 
particular representation of the feminist. At the same time, he is positioning 
himself by implication as a modern-day, 'reconstructed' man.  
 
 
 
Feminism, Equality and Extremism 
 
As noted, the most common pattern of accounting saw speakers constructing 
an image of society in which both repertoires of feminism and feminists had 
real-world referents.  This emerged time and time again where participants 
were called upon to make general statements about feminism or feminists.  
 
6. NIGEL: Erm what do you think of feminism? 
 (long pause) 
 WILLIAM: It depends on what kind of feminism (.) if it's the (.) the 
extremist feminism I got no time for it at all because I think they do 
women's issues a great deal of disservice  (OU 3: 32). 
 
 
7. NIGEL: Well what do you think feminists are after? 
NATHAN: Who knows? (laughs) well (.) 
KEITH: It depends which feminists (.) like if you'd got something like 
some official commissions on sexual equality then they're probably more 
like to be just for equality but if like you get some far-left women's libbers 
or something then they're going to be far more (.) not so much equality 
but pro (.) pro-feminist if you get my meaning 
NIGEL: No (.) not entirely 
KEITH: Above not equal  (B3: 32)  
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8. CHARLIE: I think before you carry on with this conversation (.) like most 
things (.) you have to decide on what level you're gonna actually discuss 
that subject (NIGEL: Okay) whether you're gonna discuss feminism in the 
extreme of the word feminism as we were describing it as women with big 
boots on (.) short hair or whatever (.) or [laughter] or we can look on it as 
feminism as women trying to succeed and being looked on as equals 
within society  (OU 30:9) 
 
As we can clearly see from these extracts, by far the most prevalent pattern 
was to set the two repertoires up as a common sense choice between "the 
extremists" and the rest (sometimes a residual, generally untitled, category 
and more usually the 'reasonable' feminism of equality).  The use of the 
notion of extremism is, of course, no accident, for within the context of 
many Westernised, capitalist societies, the concept stands almost as a 
synonym for unacceptability.  Wetherell and Potter (1992) have noted, for 
example, how within the discourse of white (Pãkehã) New Zealanders, the 
label "extremist" stood as a term of abuse.  What is more, they showed how 
the related assumption that a healthy, balanced and rational mind avoids 
extremes and treads a 'middle path' pervades, not just common sense, but 
also the academic domains of social, political and economic theory4 (see 
also Billig, 1982; Hall, 1986).  This common sense was clearly apparent 
within our own data, for as we can see in the next sequence of extracts, 
constructions of the "extreme" feminist typically placed great emphasis upon 
their supposed irrationality and unreasonableness5.   
 
9. NIGEL: Right (.) so I mean do you think there's different sorts? 
SEAN: Of feminists?  (NIGEL: Hm m) yes (.) you're gonna get your 
extreme (.) well (.) extreme feminism is (.) I don't know (.) they tend to be 
(.) maybe it's back to what you [i.e. Terre] said about irrationality (.) they 
just get (.) they're just at it straight away (.) (NIGEL: Hmm) totally 
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emotional (.) there's no approach to it as (.) no (.) "men are dominating 
society (.) we've got to do something drastic to stop it"  (OU 21: 5) 
 
10. SHAUN: I would say among the extremists (.) amongst the group of 
feminists (.) I mean you get some take (.) I mean they really do go to the 
extreme where they're banging and shouting and I mean going around 
and this bra burning business (.)  I mean (.) what a load of rubbish. (OU 9: 
46) 
 
11. NIGEL: What's a feminist? 
AARON: Generally (.) I dunno (.) there is an extreme feminist who you'd 
see as like (.) if you open the door for 'em you'd get a slapping. (C5: 47) 
 
It goes without saying that in constructing these representations of 'the 
extremist', speakers are simultaneously invoking its counter-point; namely, 
the rational, middle-of-the-road type of feminist.  Of course, this is precisely 
the subject position that is also, implicitly at least, being claimed by most of 
the speakers (after all, it is from that standpoint that the unreasonableness of 
the extremist becomes visible).  Significantly, however, it was also seen as 
the position that was occupied by the other group of feminists (i.e. Jekyll).  
In this respect too there are parallels to be found in Wetherell and Potter's 
analysis of racist discourse.  A number of their interviewees, for example, 
produced a similar distinction between the 'hard-core', 'militant' Mãori and 
their 'normal', run-of the-mill counter-parts - where the latter were said to 
share the same attitudes and outlook as the white, Pãkehã majority.  One of 
the main rhetorical strengths of these constructions lies in the fact that they 
allow the speaker to bolster their own image as a model of rationality.  For 
whilst the extremist feminist may 'hate men, regardless' of what they are like 
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as men (see Extract 4), the speaker appears to resist acting in kind, taking 
instead, a more judicious, reasonable or moderate stance towards the other. 
 
Moreover, if we look again at the repertoire of the feminist with whom the 
speakers are aligning themselves (i.e. Jekyll), we should see that it is 
designed in such a way as to maximize the ease of this alliance.  The 
minimal nature of their representation - they are constructed as women who 
'just' or 'simply' want equality - serves to emphasise their relative normality.  
It implies that, in all other respects, they are indistinguishable from ordinary 
(i.e. non-feminist) women. Even the specific focus on the value of equality 
also works to undermine any radical difference, for as a number of academic 
studies have shown, people today present themselves as overwhelmingly in 
favour of gender (and racial) equality (see Cochrane and Billig, 1984; van 
Dijk, 1984; Wetherell, Stiven and Potter, 1987; Billig, 1991; Wetherell and 
Potter, 1992; Gough, 1998; Edley and Wetherell, 1999).  Equality has 
become a cultural truism or commonplace (see Billig, 1987), an argument of 
principle which stands beyond question.  Defined in this way, therefore, the 
moderate feminist gets absorbed into the majority, to become an identity that 
is not only available for normal women to adopt but also, more significantly, 
ordinary men as well (see Extract 12). 
 
12. MIKE: I'm a feminist (.) (NIGEL: Yeah? okay) I kept being told by one 
woman that I can't be and that was a feminist (.) but I am a feminist 
because I really do believe that women should have equal opportunity 
with men (.) and all that goes with that (.) equal value pay (.) everything  
(OU 9: 44)   
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The rhetorical robustness of the equality principle also played a crucial role 
in the construction of unreasonableness in the Hyde repertoire.  Of course, 
the very fact that it is defined against the Jekyll repertoire implies that 
something other than equality is at stake.  Indeed, as we can see in Extracts 
13 and 14 (and also 7 above), in the Hyde version, feminists were frequently 
represented as striving for precisely the opposite. 
 
13. WILLIAM: I think a moderate feminist is someone that just wants parity 
with a male in in jobs (.) opportunity etc (.) be treated as an equal (.) 
nothing more than that 
NIGEL: Hm m (.) yeah (.) anything else? 
NICK: No (.) just equality I think (.) that's it 
NIGEL:  And (.) okay (.) so what's different about radical feminists (.) 
what are they like (.) what do they want? 
NICK: I think I get the impression they want to be superior 
WILLIAM: I think= 
NIGEL: =Sorry (.) what? 
NICK: They want to be superior to men 
NIGEL: How? 
NICK: Erm (.) they want advantages because they're a woman 
(OU 3: 32-3) 
 
14. NIGEL: What do they [extreme feminists] want? 
AARON: They want everything (.) they want to go past the half way line 
(.) they wanna [ go over (.) 
PHIL:                          [ Asexual reproduction normally 
AARON: Yeah "Right we'll let you live to the age of 30 and collect your 
semen and then we'll cut you off (.) and then we can just live as women" 
(NIGEL: Hm m) they just don't see us (.) they see us as perhaps the males 
have seen (.) the women you know back in the mid 18th century or 
whatever  (C6: 11) 
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On the face of it, it could be argued that, from a feminist point of view, there 
are certain grounds for optimism in what we have seen so far.  It might be 
claimed that although these men are identifying with a severely 
circumscribed definition of feminism, they are nonetheless accepting one of 
the central tenets of the (liberal) feminist movement; namely, that men and 
women are born equal and deserving of the same opportunities in life.  Yet, 
as is so often the case with discourse analytical work, there are reasons for 
questioning so neat a conclusion.  For if we examine some other extracts of 
data, we can find instances where the status of this principle as a cultural 
commonplace was put under pressure by using, somewhat ironically, the 
rhetoric of extremism. 
 
For example, Extracts 15 and 16 come from two entirely separate 
discussions.  The first concerned the general issue of men supporting the 
feminist movement whilst the second was on the subject of developing a 
non-sexist form of the English language.  In both, however, we see the 
emergence of a very similar kind of theme; namely, the concept of 'total' or 
'complete' equality.   
 
15. ADRIAN: It's hard to speak for everybody in our school 'cos there's lots of 
different views but (.) personally I don't think there's much more need for 
any more change of rights (.) (NIGEL: Hm m) as far as I'm concerned you 
know (.) women have got enough rights as it is at the moment and (.) I 
mean (.) there may not be complete equality but it's near enough isn't it? 
(A8: 19) 
 
16. MARCUS: I would call it a chairwoman instead of a chairperson (.)  
(NIGEL: Hmm) that's (.) that's a sexist point coming through is the person 
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(.) you're not allowed to be one or the other with real feminists (.) (NIGEL: 
Hmm) it's total equality (OU30: 8). 
 
In many of the previous extracts equality is talked about as if it were a very 
straight forward matter: you either have it or you don't.  Yet the concepts of 
'total' and 'complete' equality muddy this simple picture, introducing shades 
of grey to what was otherwise black and white.  They raise the possibility of 
various intermediate states such as partial, near or virtual equality.  As a 
consequence, the moral picture becomes more complicated too.  No longer is 
it a simple case of the great and the good lining up behind the banner of 
equality.  Within these accounts, the principle of equality becomes 
something that one should take a reasonable or moderate position upon.  It 
implies that whilst a person should be in favour of equality, it is not good to 
be fanatical about it6.  It is something that we all should want, but not too 
seriously. 
 
 
Histories of Gender Relations 
 
If we return our attention to Extract 14 for a moment, we will find that it 
ends on a rather interesting note.  For here, as elsewhere in the data, we find 
speakers constructing a history of gender relations in which some kind of 
equation or parallel is struck between contemporary (extreme) feminists and 
traditional or 'retributive' men (retributive masculinity is associated with the 
'macho' values of strength, courage and dominance - see Rutherford, 1988).  
In this particular extract, Aaron accuses both parties of holding a similarly 
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demeaning view of the opposite sex - a claim which is also echoed in the 
following, extended version of Extract Three. 
 
17. NIGEL: Give me an imaginary picture of a feminist. 
ADRIAN: I seem to think of a feminist woman as like ugly women (.) 
with like shaved hair (.) stuff like that you know (.) who can't get a chap 
and so they think "I'll become a feminist" (.) (NIGEL: Right) lesbians (.) 
that sort of thing (.) I don't know (.) well not at the time but stuff like that 
(.) someone who wants to be independent of themselves and like erm (.) 
puts men down now like men were putting women down (.) now it's 
women putting men down  (A1: 8) 
 
There are a number of significant things about these accounts that warrant 
our attention, the first concerning the way in which they acknowledge what 
is, in effect, a feminist history of gender relations.  Of course, the fact that 
the history being told here is a story of women's oppression at the hands of 
men would appear to be, initially at least, yet another promising sign from a 
feminist point of view.  Yet, crucially, both Aaron and Adrian present this 
story as a description of the past.  In other words, at the very moment 
patriarchy is recognised, its contemporary relevance is denied. 
 
However, it must be said that at different points within our interviews, 
speakers did not produce this kind of denial.  Indeed, there was quite some 
variation across accounts in terms of how our participants constructed the 
current balance of power between the sexes.  Some suggested that it was still 
a "man's world" and that women had some way to go in order to catch up.  
Others, such as Adrian in Extract 15, implied that although women were still 
a bit behind, they were fast approaching parity.  At other times again, it was 
proposed that the playing field was now level ("Now they er (.) they can 
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make them vicars now can't they?" - Harry: OU18: 21).  What was 
consistent across all of these accounts, however, was the assertion that, over 
the years, the relative status and position of women in society had steadily 
improved.  To this extent, they were all conforming to one particular view or 
narrative of history. 
 
This 'progressive' view of history is a common frame of reference in which 
society is seen as moving from a state of relative ignorance, barbarism and 
injustice towards increased enlightenment and civilisation.  It stands 
alongside alternative interpretative repertoires of historical development that 
tell very different stories including, for example, one in which the barbarities 
of modern times are unfavourably compared to the halcyon days of some 
former, golden era (see Williams, 1975; Billig, 1990; Edley, 1991 and 
Wetherell and Potter, 1992 for further discussions of these repertoires).  In 
talking about the past, people will inevitably draw upon these repertoires in 
order to construct their accounts.  The question we need to ask, therefore, is 
why was the 'progressive' repertoire of history consistently employed within 
these discussions?  What particular ideological and rhetorical advantages 
does it hold? 
 
One of the central features of this discourse of historical progress is that it 
embodies a sense of almost evolutionary change (certainly the supposed 
movement of society from a state of barbarism to civilisation contains a 
strongly Darwinian flavour).  More specifically, it carries forward a sense 
both of the inevitability of society's improvement and also of the pace of that 
development.  By definition, evolutionary change implies a slow or gradual 
transformation, a process that cannot be hurried or forced.  As an account, 
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therefore, it has profound consequences for any feminist politics determined 
to change the course of history.  Indeed, if we consider Extract 18, we can 
see clear evidence of the way in which its rhetorical potential is harnessed 
and exploited.  
 
18. NIGEL: What do you think today's feminists are arguing for now? 
ANDY: I suppose they want it to be greater speed and haste probably (.) I 
think the thing's moving in the right direction anyway (NIGEL: Hmm) so 
I think it's just (.) I mean you can't have women in managers overnight (.) I 
mean (.) so there is gonna be a sort of coming up in the ranks and men 
have had lots of years [laughs] to get to that position  (OU8: 5) 
 
Notice, for example, the work done by the word 'anyway'.  Used in this 
context it implies that the improvement of women's position in western 
society has occurred irrespective of the efforts of feminists.  Within this 
account, the movement towards equality follows a different, evolutionary 
logic.  It implies, not only that women are 'getting there' (slowly but surely) 
but also perhaps that, in waiting for the inevitable, they should be tolerant of 
current inequalities.  Similar kinds of themes were evident elsewhere in the 
data, such as in the next sequence of talk where, once again, we see it argued 
that the appropriate ('sensible') route for women's advancement is gradual 
and step-wise. 
 
19. NIGEL: Are [extreme feminists] merely just more noisy erm versions of 
moderate feminists? 
 SHAUN: I wouldn't er (.) I wouldn't say they're more noisy ones (.) I think 
that the ones that there the ones that are demanding such as jobs they're 
looking at (.) instead of looking sensibly and taking it a step at a time (.) 
progressing (.) they're looking straight away from going at one level (.) er 
as a woman solicitor straight to a High Court judge or something (.) as an 
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example (.) they're wanting the top positions now (.) whereas instead of 
working (.) I mean even a man has to work his way through it (OU9: 45-7) 
 
 
 
Constructing Feminism: Personal and Political Implications 
 
In our analysis so far we have looked at some of the ways in which mixed 
samples of men talked about feminism and feminists.  In the first section, we 
noted that there appeared to be two distinctive, Jekyll and Hyde style, 
repertoires in current conversational circulation: 'Jekyll' is the ordinary 
woman who simply wants equality while 'Hyde' is the unfeminine feminist 
and extreme political activist.  Even the most cursory glance at these two 
repertoires reveals that they are constructed in such a way as to encourage an 
equivocal stance with regard to feminism: for one is beyond reproach, the 
other beyond redemption.  One of the main rhetorical strengths of this 
arrangement becomes apparent if we consider the wider issue of men's self-
presentation.  Elsewhere, we have suggested that men today face a delicate 
and sometimes dilemmatic task of juggling between two quite contradictory 
gender identities or masculine positions (Edley and Wetherell, 1997 - see 
also Rutherford, 1988 and Billig et al., 1988).  They have to steer an uneasy 
course between, what we have called 'the Scylla of the macho man and the 
Charybdis7 of the wimp'.  It is here that the dual construction of the feminist 
comes into its own, for it gives men some important rhetorical flexibility.  In 
short, it means that they can have it both ways; they can be both 'pro' and 
'anti', in favour and against, both supportive and, at the same time, critical of 
feminists. 
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Our study has also revealed the crucial role that the value of equality plays 
within the surrounding debates.  In a sense, it appeared as a rhetorical centre 
piece, the hub of a wheel around which all of the other arguments 
articulated.  For instance, it stood as both the source and emblem of the 
moderate feminists' reasonableness, the very basis upon which many of our 
interviewees alleged their support.  And yet, through the analyses that 
followed, we saw how some speakers managed, in a sense, to dodge the 
authority of this cultural common-place.  We heard it implied, for example, 
that feminists could become too obsessed with gaining equality and that 
there was a point at which any reasonable person would accept just a small 
measure of inequity.  We heard it suggested that whilst, in principle, women 
deserved equal representation in public life, in practice they would have to 
bide their time as they worked up through the ranks (see also Edley and 
Wetherell, 1999; Wetherell et al., 1987).  We also saw accounts that 
undermined the very raison d'être of feminist politics, by representing the 
(hi)story of women's struggle for power as subject to the laws of nature, 
rather than man (sic). 
 
What is more, if we consider the issue carefully, we will see that the concept 
of equality that is being recycled within these turns has a very specific 
character.  Put simply, equality here seems to connote sameness.  The notion 
that men and women are the same underneath or prior to their gender 
socialisation is, of course, by no means new.  Indeed, as Connell (1987) 
points out, it was a central component of liberal feminist arguments that 
were dominant throughout the 1960s and 70s.  The problems with this 
assumption are also well known, at least within feminist circles.  In 
particular, it has been found to encourage, not a respect for gender 
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differences and diversity, but the direct comparison of women's abilities, 
behaviour and character with a "gold-standard" set by men8.  We can see this 
very clearly in our final extract of data (Extract 20) which emerged within 
the context of a discussion about the legitimacy of moderate feminism.  In 
the previous few turns Nathan and Keith had appeared to be united in their 
support, indeed, Nathan had just commented upon the ludicrousness of 
women not receiving equal pay for the same kind of work.  Neil, however, 
refuses to fall into line.    
 
20. NEIL: If you want feminism you've got to take the good with the bad like 
get down the pit and get in the front line (.) if you think you're equal get 
out and prove it which I don't think they are physically and you can't 
claim to be equal when you're not because people are different and some 
women are stronger than some men and you know they can't just 
generalise about "We're equal to them" I mean I think people shouldn't 
discrimate on any basis as far as jobs or equal pay or anything like that's 
concerned 
NATHAN: Yeah (.) you shouldn't really be able to find discrimination 
against women or positive discrimination on their half for anything like 
that really (.) it should be equal (.) the best person for the best job (.) free 
market sort of thing  (B3:32) 
 
As we can see, Neil's argument is that women deserve to be treated as equal 
only when they do the same things as men - when they 'get down the pit and 
get in the front line'.  The choice of these examples is, of course, no accident, 
for mining and warmongering represent two of the more prototypically 
masculine forms of activity.  In other words, they are occupations that are 
commonly assumed to require the specifically masculine qualities of 
courage, aggression and physical strength.  Within Neil's account they 
appear as 'the bad' (i.e. the dangerous and dirty work) that men accept along 
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with 'the good' (i.e. the privileges associated with being a man).  According 
to this logic, therefore, men are constructed as deserving their exalted status.  
They are seen as, not just different from women, but better.  As Betty 
Friedan (1965) pointed out so long ago, 'difference' here for women means 
less. 
 
However, there is an interesting rhetorical shift in the middle of Neil's 
argument that sees him developing a different and, in many ways, 
contradictory rhetorical trajectory.  The switch appears to pivot around the 
phrase 'people are different'.  As we have seen, prior to its enunciation, Neil 
has been arguing that women's claims to equality are illegitimate.  His point 
is that feminists are guilty of ignoring the fact that men and women are not 
(at least 'physically') the same.  'People are different' he says.  Yet, ironically, 
this phrase is also a central trope or commonplace of a liberal individualism 
that tends, within Western cultures at least, to erode or undermine such 
categorical statements.  What is more, as if cued by this alternative rhetoric, 
Neil goes on to paint a more individualistic scenario in which 'some women 
are stronger than some men'.  The very caution against making 
'generalisations' also makes an appearance (albeit in the form of an 
accusation levelled against feminists), as does a denunciation of 
'discrimination'.  Significantly, however, when these liberal themes are 
picked up and developed by Nathan, we can see that the force of this rhetoric 
is turned to an equally reactionary end.  Indeed, what seems to be invoked in 
his discourse is an image of society as a 'free market' or competition in 
which men's differences as men puts them justifiably ahead of the game. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have analysed some of the ways in which men talk about 
feminism and feminists.  We have described in some detail the two main 
interpretative repertoires through which accounts of the feminist are built 
and seen something of how these resources are manipulated and exploited in 
the course of our participants' conversations.  One of the main advantages of 
this discourse analytic approach is that it enables us to appreciate something 
of the complexity of this ideological field.  Talk about feminism and 
feminists displays an array of different rhetorical positions and arguments 
nuanced in subtle ways which make it not only impossible to separate out 
the pro from the anti-feminist, but also difficult to predict the overall 
direction of social and political change.  Nevertheless, it could be said that 
from a feminist point of view, our overall findings provide little room for 
optimism.  For it would appear that the most readily available ways of 
talking (and thinking) about feminists encourages men (and possibly women 
too) to identify with a definition of feminism that is almost entirely emptied 
of any radical potential.  In certain respects our analysis points to the 
enduring ideological dominance of Thatcherism (see Hall, 1988 and Levitas, 
1986), such that gender equality comes to be understood as women taking 
their place alongside men in an economic, social and political battle of each 
against all.  Indeed, it is precisely within this ideological frame that, say, 
programmes of affirmative action for women (and other minority groups) 
get resisted and rejected as 'unfair' or 'discriminatory'.  As was so apparent 
during the 80's, the ideology of the (then) New Right worked against many 
forms of collective action.  What is perhaps not so obvious is the way that, 
Pr
e-P
rin
t
within the context of a new (and New) Labour government, such activities 
are still constructed as extreme.    
 
 
Notes 
 
1. Jekyll and Hyde - characters from a story by R.L. Stevenson about a 
person in whom two opposing personalities (one good the other evil) 
alternate. 
 
2. This research has been supported by the Economic and Social 
Research Council (Grant No. R000233129) and research funds from 
the Open University and the Faculty of Humanities, Nottingham Trent 
University. We would like to thank Christine Griffin for her 
perceptive and thoughtful comments on an earlier version of this 
paper. As ever, we owe a huge debt of thanks to the men whose 
willingness to give of their time and energy made this whole project 
possible. 
 
3. In Roman mythology, Janus was the god of entrances or gateways.  In 
his temple he had a statue with two faces looking in opposite 
directions - one into the future the other into the past. 
 
4. These assumptions also find strong echoes in both Blair and Clinton's 
advocacy of the so-called middle or 'third' way (see Giddens, 1998). 
 
5. It is not insignificant, of course, that in this respect, the construction 
of the "extreme" feminist repeats a core component of the traditional 
gender stereotype of women (see Williams and Bennett, 1975). 
 
6. It is perhaps worth noting that within the interviews the terms 
'complete' and 'total' were also used in reference to feminists 
themselves.  In other words, some participants drew a distinction 
between moderate feminists on the one hand and 'total' and/or 
'complete feminists' on the other. 
 
7. Scylla and Charybdis - "two dangers or extremes such that one can be 
avoided only by approaching the other [monster and whirlpool in 
Greek mythology]" (Oxford Pocket Dictionary) 
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8. The setting up of assertiveness classes for women is a good case in 
point, when predicated upon the assumption that, compared to men, 
women lacked assertiveness. 
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